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PRINCIPLES OF VOLUNTARISM.

I.

A TENABLE theory of knowledge must furnish both an adequate conception of the end and goal of all thinking and an effective method of determining how far ideas contribute to the attainment of this end. It must tell us in what Truth consists ideally, and how particular ideas may be actually verified. The need for holding both of these requirements distinct, and for emphasising each equally, may not be at once apparent. One may seem to imply the other as a matter of course: we cannot discover the aim of thinking (it would appear) without throwing light on the process of its attainment and, conversely, an investigation of the actual procedure of obtaining knowledge is bound in some measure to reveal the essential character of knowledge itself. Yet the history of epistemology shows how difficult it is to do equal justice to both aspects of the knowledge problem, how interest in one aspect almost inevitably leads the investigator to slight or misunderstand the other. Thus the school of Rationalism has been chiefly interested in the end or goal of thinking, which it has understood as a self-consistent body of ideas, a unified system of thought. From the ideal of thought as thus conceived, it has derived a criterion of truth, coherence or consistency. The actual process of obtaining knowledge turns out thus to be a logical exercise, yielding a system of concepts possessed of an admirable internal consistency and coherence, but lacking the one essential of real existence. The Empiricist school, on the other hand, has always been inclined to treat the problem of knowledge historically: it has sought to find out the different ways in which specific facts are actually discovered. Thus Empiricists have dwelt chiefly upon observation, experiment, and induction, as methods of securing knowledge. Generally, however, they have neglected the end or aim for the sake of which observations and experiments have been made; they have been content to let an assortment or miscellany of facts represent Truth to them, thus failing to satisfy thought's demand for system and completeness. Now, if we are to profit by the development of philosophic ideas, we must seek to avoid both of these opposing errors. We must so conceive of the end and aim of thought that its realization shall necessitate a constant appeal to actual existence, and so understand the process of discovering new facts that it shall contribute to the universal aim of all thinking.

Of how this task may be accomplished we receive a valuable suggestion from the development undergone by the two historic standpoints just mentioned. For both Rationalism and Empiricism appear in earlier and later stages of development. Descartes and the earlier Rationalists believed that we obtain true knowledge when by a process of conceptual analysis we discover the implications of certain first principles which are already inherent in the nature of intelligence (and whose eternal truth is signified by their clearness and consistency). For Locke and the earlier Empiricists knowledge was accumulated by comparing and combining the ideas received ready-made through the channels of sense-perception. By neither party was knowing conceived as a constructive or creative activity; by both it was understood as a becoming aware of that which, as truth or as fact, existed already formed or finished. According to the later Rationalism represented by Kant, however, we gain knowledge when, by creative synthesis, we organize the data of sense into a coherent system whose constitutive principles derive validity from the service they perform in such work of organization. In a more fully developed Empiricism appearing finally as Pragmatism, thinking is conceived as an activity of adjustment, essentially experimental in character, which seeks verification for ideas in the results of purposive action. Thus we see these two theories, ancient antagonists, becoming less one-sided and more concrete as they become more *dynamic*, giving a larger and larger place to action in the cognitive process.

The direction of development in modern epistemology clearly suggests, therefore, that we may hope for a final solution of the knowledge problem only if we refuse to separate theory from practice, only if we insist upon treating thought as an expression of will. For it is only in so far as the ideal of Truth—a coherent system of ideas complete because comprehending all reality—is pursued as an end of will, a practical task, that its attainment involves a constant appeal to objective reality. We may analyze ideas and combine them into systems without interference from, or sanction by reality, but we cannot act upon ideas without receiving the judgment of reality upon them. If knowing is a species of voluntary activity, Truth—as James has said in a pregnant passage—is one species of Good, the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief.

II.

The problem of knowledge thus broadens into the problem of conduct, since thought is itself a species of voluntary action and in voluntary action alone we come into direct contact with objective reality. Is there not reason to hope that the operation of will, the original activity of our nature, would, if genuinely understood, give us a key to the meaning of human life and the world of human experience? Undertaking with this expectation, then, the study of volition, we find ourselves in need of a preliminary definition which shall, at least provisionally, fix the meaning which we give to the word. To formulate such definition is not so very difficult—at least after a troublesome preliminary question is satisfactorily disposed of. This question is whether we shall feel obliged to define will altogether in terms of the events and processes described by the natural sciences and especially Biology, or whether we shall admit as equally valid, and possibly more relevant, the standpoint of the normative sciences and, in particular, Ethics. Now to insist upon defining volition altogether in terms of organic behavior, thus ruling out of court the conclusions of the sciences of value, moral and social, seems the sheerest pedantry; it is equivalent to rejecting the direct and natural way of approaching the subject in favor of the indirect and artificial, and this upon methodological and scholastic grounds. Suppose, then, that we look directly at the operation of will in the conduct of man, as it manifests itself in the evolution of human society and civilization, and also in our own choices and pursuits. What do we find? We find first that volition is a factor in the physical world of bodies and motion, that it directs the movements of the physical organism which it inhabits and, in consequence, influences the movements of other bodies both living and non-living. But we find it playing also quite a different part: that of choosing between objects in accordance with their comparative value as ends. The objects which constitute this second realm of ends are related, not according to their position or sequence in the mechanical order, but according to congruities or incongruities of meaning, in a teleological system. The standing of an end as member of such a teleological system is determined by its degree of comprehensiveness, by the number of lesser interests for which it provides. So viewed, in the light of human history and experience, will appears as a power constantly striving so to control the forces of nature and adjust the tendencies of social life as to bring about the most comprehensive satisfaction of human personality. Condensing this statement with a view to conciseness, we obtain a working definition of volition. Will, we therefore define as *that power in man which strives to initiate such sequences of movement as satisfy the greatest variety of interests.*

In adopting this definition we recognize that will aims in its operation at extending and enlarging the scope of its own activity. Hence it might not inappropriately be described as a self-expanding, or self-organizing, activity. Thus we should relate volition to the self-preservative tendency characteristic of all life—not deriving it from life or regarding it as a further development of the instinct of self-preservation, however; since will as we conceive it is the original activity of conscious experience and the source of all its principles and categories. The description of volition as a self-expanding activity is not incorrect; it is insufficient because abstract. The definition just proposed is by contrast concrete because it attributes the ability of will to extend the range of its own activity to two powers which it possesses, the power of coördinating movements and the power of choosing between interests. Will comes upon the scene equipped with the ability to initiate movement having three parameters and to appreciate the comparative value of generic qualities or characters. This ability we usually explain as the outcome of action performed before the advent of volition and due to instinct or impulse, through whose operation certain complexes of qualities have become associated with definite kinæsthetic ideas. Such explanations are subject to the qualification made above that they all presuppose will as the fundamental activity of human experience, and hence cannot possibly reduce it to a secondary or derivative status; but with this reservation admitted, they are useful to illustrate and enforce our main contention that volition does not undertake incidentally to direct movement or, in lieu of something better, interest itself in such satisfactions as our human situation affords; it *is* such a coördinating of movements as increases the variety of possible satisfactions.

To volition, kinæsthetic and teleological experience are essential; with volition both are originally given. The experience of movement contains both sensational and affective constituents. On the side of sensation it is analyzable into experiences of pressure and of strain, with associated visual images. Here the original experience is perhaps that of striving against and overcoming resistance, on several points simultaneously or on one (or more) successively. Teleologically, the root experience is one of latitude or scope, of the liberty to range unhindered within a definite circle of interests. The qualities which promise satisfaction and to which interest attaches fall into a limited number of classes, being distributed among the familiar sense-departments. To these qualities names are given which fix their status as universals. They are not of course experienced separately, but joined in complexes of endless variety. The constituent qualities of these complexes are distinguished because we find the same ones present in different combinations. Some are of interest directly because they promise satisfaction themselves, such as tastes, odors, touch qualities, etc. Others, such as colors, shapes, sounds and the like usually attract indirectly because they are signs of the presence of qualities valuable on their own account. Certain complexes of qualities (objects necessary for existence, like food) are at first supremely attractive. But this original pleasantness does not decide their permanent value or result in their habitual choice. It causes them originally to be sought and realized; but their comparative value for volition depends upon the range of further activities to which they open the way. Thus the value of food for a developing will depends upon the strength which it supplies for further activities. Moreover, as it gains further use of its powers, will discovers ends which promise a greater variety of satisfactions than these objects of natural desire. While a handful of bananas may give strength for a day's journey or a cave within a rock a night's shelter, a herd of cattle will provide a winter's sustenance for a family and a house serve to centralize their diverse activities and employments during a period of years. Through experimenting with different qualities and groups of qualities volition seeks to discover which are thus most comprehensive and, through the elaboration of movements, endeavors to provide for their realization. Thus arise an order of movements and a realm of ends; but no matter how highly organized the system of purposes, or how complicated the plans of movement of a voluntary agent, they are all made of material originally given to volition in the form of kinæsthetic or teleological qualities.

To discuss at all fully either the kinds of movement which volition is able to initiate and direct, or the interests among which it can choose, is manifestly impossible. It will be sufficient to recognize that both movements and interests fall into two main classes. Of movements there are first the main bodily movements of trunk and limbs by which objects are moved and manipulated and the location of the body itself is altered, and, second, the movements of the speech-organs and muscles that determine facial expression, by which meaning is communicated to other agents and their conduct influenced. Interests are also divided on a parallel line, into those which appeal directly to the agent and those which are indirectly appreciated through communication. (This duality, present in both the order of motion and the realm of ends, is the root of the difference between the world of nature and that of inter-subjective intercourse.)

The regular operation of will proceeds through three stages. The first is that of ideation. In contrast to objects that are actual, that is, maintained by present effort of attention and by established motor adjustment, is set an object which is possible (or ideal), that is, the outcome of incipient coördinations of movement and the source of future satisfactions. The second is action. The sequence of motor adjustments which promises to result in the imagined object is initiated and carried through. The third is satisfaction. The object chosen is experienced as the result of effortful action and the source of further possibilities of satisfaction. The unity thus established between chosen interest and requisite motor adjustment is immediately experienced in a feeling which, whatever it may be called, feeling of unity, of achievement, of power, is unique and conclusive. The office of volition is frequently (and correctly) said to be the realization of ideas as ends. What then is meant by realizing an idea? An idea is realized when it is re-experienced as the result of a sequence of movements, and thus made the source of varied possibilities of satisfaction, and a starting-point for new efforts of action. The ideal object is thus converted from possibility to actuality by being brought into dynamic relation with actual existence. Suppose that on a hot day I resolve to visit the shore of a near-by lake, being attracted by the thought of the comfortable seat which I expect to find on the sands of the shore, the cool refreshing breeze that will blow, and the pleasant view it will afford. I take the road that I believe leads in that direction and set out on my walk. Finally, I arrive at the lake-shore, pleased that I have found my way and prepared to enjoy the features of the situation that appealed to my fancy. My idea of the lake has been realized in that direct way in which all ideas are originally realized—by action and fulfilment.

Thus far we have considered but one factor in the conduct situation, the human will, with its capacities and mode of operation. But will does not operate in a vacuum; it is conditioned in all its activity by objective reality. This is then the other factor in the realm of human conduct. Now objective reality is not to be deduced or derived from will; it must be accepted as equally ultimate with volition itself. It is not even inferred from certain results of voluntary action; it is directly experienced in all volition. Objective reality is directly experienced as that which permits and in this way sanctions, or which frustrates and thus denies, the activity of will. Reality gives its sanction to our will when it permits the course of action voluntarily undertaken to reach its intended goal. It negates volition by interfering with such course of action and bringing it to an unexpected outcome. But whether favorable or unfavorable, the voluntary agent receives the verdict of reality when he essays to act. In action the will is face to face with objective existence.

In cases where objective reality gives its sanction to chosen lines of conduct and thus validates their guiding ideas, its mode of influence seems clear. It permits the sequence of movements to proceed uninterrupted to their intended goal. Reality introduces no new factor, makes no positive contribution of its own. But in the opposite case, where reality checks or frustrates the proposed action, the case is different. Here it does appear to force upon operative volition new and unwelcome facts, to break the continuity of voluntary action by thrusting in foreign and intractable material. This type of experience makes realists of us all: where objective existence rises before us as a wall of stone, blocking every effort of our will, a stone-wall against which we can beat our heads, full of idealistic theories as they may be, in vain. The problem here involved is of momentous importance. How does objective reality act to limit and circumscribe volition? We must if possible get light upon this point for it is the crux of the whole matter. Let us turn back to the illustration of voluntary action lately used. Suppose that I am walking over the road which, the guidepost assures me, leads to the lake. I come to a place where the road goes over a bridge which spans a deep ravine through the rocky bed of which a small stream flows. I see that the bridge is dismantled, preparatory to reconstruction. I halt at the edge of the ravine and survey the prospect. The sides of the ravine are steep but I see a way to descend and climb the other side. The stream at the bottom is low and numerous rocks in its bed offer stepping-places to cross. I descend, cross with some effort and difficulty, scale the opposite bank and continue my journey. Or imagine that I reach my intended destination without such interruption but find that the expected features do not materialize. The wind is blowing off-shore perhaps, or there are swarms of mosquitoes. I must either go home disappointed or, may be, walk around to the other shore of the lake. Now in either case reality has interfered to limit or frustrate my will. How has it done this? Certainly not by forcing upon me hitherto unknown experiences, by injecting into my consciousness foreign elements! Unexpected, disconcerting, the experiences were, but not altogether unfamiliar. The motor adjustments required to go down into the ravine were nearly if not quite as well-known to me as those incidental to walking over the bridge—if they had not been I could not have negotiated them. The sultry heat and the mosquitoes were as familiar as the cool air and fresh breeze—if they had not been I could not have recognized them. No, in the first instance reality limited my will by interrupting the expected sequence of movements and forcing me to alter them, if indeed I wished to continue acting at all and not meet disaster which should terminate my career as a voluntary agent. Objective reality forced me in a most unwelcome way to make new adjustments, to reverse my program of action. In a similar manner in the second case it thwarted my will by denying me the outcome I expected from my course of action. Instead of being permitted to relax my efforts in a choice of the enjoyments offered by a seat on the lake-shore, I was forced to immediate readjustments whose results were so unpleasant as to convince me that I must journey farther if I wished to taste the pleasures I sought.

The process of action in which we receive the verdict of reality upon our ideas has been sketched only in the most summary and, it may justly seem, superficial manner. The most of our actions, like the one used in our illustration, are far from being simple movements or even single motor coördinations. They consist of a series of motor coördinations, the perceived result of one being the cue for the performance of the next, and so on through to the end of the series. More accurately, the result of each successive motor adjustment, as perceived, must contain the plan for the next movement required by the projected program of action. In going to the lake I walk down the garden path to the street; this, when I have reached it, I perceive as the street which two blocks north crosses the road that I think leads to the lake; following the street for two blocks I come to the crossing of the road which I perceive as going east towards the lake. Now, in the cases where reality thwarts our actions, it does this by bringing one of the motor adjustments to an unlooked for result, which is identical with forcing us to change our plan for the succeeding movement, such change being at variance with our pre-conceived program and leading us away from its expected goal. So the walk around the bend of the road to the brow of the ravine brings me not to the unbroken span of the bridge but to the gaping abyss of the ravine. One may ask at just this point if reality does not force me to change my course of conduct by presenting me with new facts? Were not the facts of the broken bridge received by my perceptive faculties the occasion and cause of my change of action? To this question the answer is that my perception of the bridge as broken was itself a new plan of action—a broken bridge is a bridge that cannot be crossed but must be gotten by in some other fashion. But the questioner may persist: Was not the new plan of action with its ideas of motor response evoked by certain qualities presented by the bridge as an existing fact? These existing qualities were in this instance those of form and color—as I approach the bridge its floor does not present an expanse continuous with the roadway, instead it breaks the continuity of the latter with an irregular shadowy gap. But this objection is removed by a more detailed analysis of the motor coördinations involved. The unexpected and disconcerting appearance of the bridge comes from the unexpected adjustments which I am compelled to make, of muscles connected with the visual sense.

Instead of sending my gaze freely and without hindrance along the dusty-brown streak which is the sign of open road and uninterrupted passage, I am compelled to readjust my sense of sight to the presence of a darker segment dividing the aforesaid dusty-brown roadway into two sections. But why are the eye movements thus interrupted and forced to readjustment? Because the break is there compelling me to do so? No, this would be getting the cart before the horse; it was the interruption of the expected continuity that forced me to divide what promised to be continuous into three sections. We seem here to have come to the limits of analysis and are face to face with the ultimate fact. In such cases, we are compelled to make readjustment because *objective reality checks, hinders, and makes impossible, our attempted movements.*

A final question may be briefly answered before we proceed. Do we then never experience qualities *as qualities*, that is, as general characters or universals, and not forecasts of movement? Yes, we do, when the action is completed, when the sequence of movements reaches its intended outcome. Then the object we experience is not such as requires from us an effort of movement, but such as offers to us a choice of satisfactions. These possibilities of satisfaction resident in objects hold at all times and for all wills; they are hence universal qualities or characters. Because such satisfactory qualities were anticipated, the action itself was undertaken, and the fact that they are thrown open to the choice of the agent shows that it has reached its intended goal.

The facts just stated in regard to the limitations imposed upon our wills by objective reality have an important bearing upon the relation of thought to this objective reality. Indeed, if the account given is correct, it contains more than a hint of the solution of this most difficult problem of epistemology. In the first place, we see that it is in an important sense true that we can know only our own ideas, which are not themselves reality, but interpretations of reality in kinæsthetic or teleological imagery. To these interpretations Reality says yes or no; it does not do this, however, by breaking into consciousness and forcing upon our attention new and unwelcome facts or objects.

It says no to our ideas by forcing us when we are acting upon them to stop and form new ideas which are of course new plans of action or working hypotheses, to be tested by immediate action. Reality thus rules out certain of our ideas but supplies us none to take their place. We are obliged ourselves to formulate the new theories and hypotheses. And the materials to be used in these formulations must be drawn from the same limited stock out of which the rejected ones were formed. If the real situation compels me to essay climbing down into the ravine instead of walking over the bridge as I expected, the component movements are as familiar to my thought as were those of my earlier program and drawn from the same original experience of motion. Hence it is quite incorrect to say that objective reality supplies the material of our ideas while intelligence gives the form. The material is, rather, given along with the power of thought or of will itself. No matter how widely our thought may range, its constituent materials must be motions in a world of three dimensions and qualities which fall within a limited number of sense-departments. Thought is provided with these materials already formed in judgments as the outcome (we say) of instinctive adjustment. No other material than this is available to thought, nor given in the most surprising or unusual experiences of action. Imagine that reality interrupts the expected sequence of our voluntary activities by way of an accident—that I come to the broken bridge on a dark night and plunge over into the ravine. As long as I retain possession of my senses and can make any effort while falling, it is only to struggle in familiar ways, to move trunk and limbs with the vague expectation or hope of producing an accustomed result. And if I were conscious at all after striking, it would be of qualities which I recognized as pain, hardness, wet, etc. Indeed, if the proposal is made to derive one of the two factors, form and matter, from objective reality and the other from subjective intelligence, it would seem more reasonable to hold that reality supplied the form while intellect furnished the matter. But this statement would be subject to such reservations as would largely destroy its significance. For it cannot be denied that intelligence or will furnishes an important part of the form of our experience as well as the matter. To be capable of realization, and hence known as true, movements must have regularity of procedure and qualities retain their specific characters and relationship of subsumption. The material of knowledge takes from the first the form of judgment—judgments of existence and of value. Besides the material, then, the fundamental relations which constitute the framework of the objective world are furnished by will itself; for how could ideas be realized at all unless movements could be depended upon to proceed in fixed sequences and qualities to maintain their relations of inclusion and exclusion? But within the framework thus provided, the orders of existence and of value, particular events and qualities are related according to the dictates of reality delivered in the manner just described.

III.

After an idea is realized in action, it becomes a permanent possibility of satisfaction. Such ideas are preserved in their dynamic relations by thought. Thought appears originally as a factor in the operation of will, as that ideating activity by which future actions are planned and satisfactions anticipated. It develops into a specialized form of volition which exhibits all the essential features of will under its own characteristic form of idea. Its aim is to formulate an ideal system which shall represent all the objects that can be realized, *i. e.*, all possible satisfactions of the human will. This supreme end, Truth, is of course but an expression of the supreme end of volition, under the form of idea or belief. Truth is sought by thought as any other end of volition is pursued—by effortful action. The effort of thought is expended in an attempt to correlate and organize ideas that have been verified and stand as facts within the most coherent possible system, and to devise new actions and experiments in order to verify ideas which, if facts, would tend to fill in the gaps and thus complete the ideal system. Its rule is that of consistency: that objects shall preserve their identity and retain their relations of sequence and subsumption. This principle is of course only an expression of the unity of volition:

objects in order to be attainable must remain the same and have permanent relations.

An objection may be interposed at this point to the treating of thought as a special expression of will which is said to exhibit all its characteristic features, on the ground that we have by definition asserted movement to be an essential factor in volition while thought does not involve motion at all. This apparent inconsistency disappears, however, if we make allowance for the changes undergone by the essential features of volition as a result of their being cast in the form of idea. For while thought does not move about in the world of actual perception, it does, when dealing with actual existence, project and correlate movements. Not that it merely represents or imagines movements that have actually occurred; it really constructs figures and postulates motions within its own ideal medium, as the development of pure mathematics amply proves. Moreover, in thus constructing ideal systems and sequences of movement for the purpose of organizing the facts of existence, it is under the control of objective reality, just as actual movement is. In this case reality appears in the guise of ideas which have been verified and stand as facts. These established facts in the realm of thought challenge, check, and frustrate proposed theoretical constructions, just as objective reality interrupts and upsets the courses of action which we undertake.

In constructing its ideal system, thought, as we have seen, relates ideas dynamically—in terms of the activities required to produce them. These activities, it has appeared, are of two main sorts, movement and choice. The objects which thought represents as real are consequently conceived in terms either of the movements required to attain them or of the various qualities which these exhibit when attained. In this way there develop simultaneously in the realm of thought two conceptual orders, the mechanical and the teleological. The first is of course the material world, the world of objects impinging upon one another in space; the second is the ideal or spiritual world, the world of qualities related by congruities or incongruities of meaning. The former is the world of existences, of temporal and spatial contiguities; the latter is the world of essence, of qualities related by identities of character.

Each of these worlds may be seen to have developed through three stages correlated with, and consequent upon, the steps which volition itself has taken in pursuit of complete satisfaction. In the mind of primitive man there is no thought of separating the two orders, although in his confused intelligence each is discernible in its incipiency. His world is an aggregate of things all having particular place and existence, while at the same time possessing generic qualities and satisfying common human interests. On the mechanical side he understands little of the effect of objects upon one another, conceiving them almost exclusively in relation to his own bodily movements (and the movements of supposed beings like himself); teleologically, he comes to have some dim idea of how qualities are related according to degree of generality, recognizing at least that some are more and some less common. The next stage in the evolution of thought comes after man has learned by increasing experience how objects act upon one another, and comes to depend for desired results not altogether upon his own bodily movements but upon the movements of other bodies, their causes, which he, by his own hands, sets in operation. On the side of value, there is a dawning recognition that qualities may be related not merely by the extent of their generality or commonness, but also by virtue of their varying comprehensiveness—certain ends like wealth or reputation receiving special attention not because they are so widespread or common but because they include so many further satisfactions. The third stage in intellectual development comes after man has gained large control over the forces of nature and extensively organized his social and political life. Rapidly enlarging experience of the actual world leads him to separate in his thought the mechanical from the teleological orders and his increased success in dealing with the forces of nature after he has made this separation encourages him to render it complete. Secondary qualities are therefore eliminated entirely from the material world and it is conceived altogether in terms of motion, as a complexus of movements varying in direction and velocity. Far-reaching social and political organization leads human thought to attempt a formulation of the teleological order likewise complete in itself, and exclusive of the mechanical. Thereupon mechanism, with its necessary particularity and incompleteness, along with space and even time perhaps, are transcended and reality is conceived as a completely organized system of ends, all being finally included within an absolute and all-comprehensive end, or Good.

Thus the two worlds, mechanical and spiritual, have come to confront one another in modern thought, so different as to seem out of any conceivable relation, even that of antagonism. Is this dualism final? Thought is naturally restive under it, for such dualism conflicts directly with the intellectual ideal of coherence and unity. Yet, if our account of its origin be correct, it can never be removed, nor can the two orders be united by any purely theoretical construction. This is impossible because the difference between them goes back to the fundamental nature of will itself, and hence conditions the very existence of thought as a special development of volition. Since, moreover, the dualism between movement and choice, necessity and freedom, goes back to the will itself, it can be removed only by activity of volition. It will be removed only when the order of movements is experienced as affording complete satisfaction to the system of personal interests. To bring this about is a practical task, not a theoretical problem. The spiritualization of the world is an end to be realized, to be realized by action, by effort and striving to adjust mechanical forces to the needs of personal development. And its achievement, like any other achievement, must first be experienced immediately in an emotion of satisfaction. Obviously, the reconciliation of nature to spirit, as a task of the human will, has not yet been accomplished, nor has the feeling of final satisfaction which is the crown of completely successful labor been yet experienced by any man. If this experience of ultimate unity, of final synthesis, has been anticipated in part by anyone, it is by the man who, laboring for the welfare of humanity, invents a machine, organizes an industry, administers a government, founds an institution, which he sees working for human betterment.

If we thus view the reconciliation of mechanism and purpose as a practical or moral task, we shall have reason to regard the separation of the two orders, and particularly the exclusion of all value and meaning from the mechanical order, as a sign of promise rather than a cause of discouragement. For it is only as the mechanical world is emptied of all quality and conceived in terms of movement solely that it is capable of thoroughgoing mathematical, that is to say, intellectual, formulation. And it is through such mathematical formulation that human science will be able to analyze existing movements into their simpler components and discover new combinations which may by experiment prove to increase the fullness of human satisfaction. Modern civilization is the result of just such increasing subjection of the forces of nature to the interests of human development, due to the constructions of pure science. But the work promises to be long and full of difficulty and danger. Human volition will scarcely be equal to the task unless sustained by a faith in its potency and permanence. Such beliefs as that in the permanence and potency of personality, and the ultimate triumph of spirit over matter, are of course but postulates; they are verified as all beliefs are, by the results of action, by the aid they give us in accomplishing our task, in overcoming the world.

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